THE BURNED OVER DISTRICT

The NY Times does a piece on the militias in Iraq today. They examine how Shia and militia leaders have worked to place their people into influential positions within the police and other power structures of the government. With their Mahdi Army, Badr Group and pesh merga, those who were so long powerless have taken the first steps to consolidate their power outside the electoral process.

Though many Shiite leaders denounced the anti-Sunni reprisals this week, none of them chastised the Mahdi Army or called for disbanding it. That itself was a clear indication of how the politicians were looking to the militia as a protector of Shiite interests in the wake of the shrine attack.

Those political leaders who have no militias, particularly Sunni Arabs, say they feel more helpless than ever in this shifting landscape of private armies.

"Anybody who has a militia now has power," said Adnan Pachachi, a former foreign minister and member of the newly elected Parliament. "The Mahdi Army, Badr, the insurgents, these are the ones who wield power. They have weapons, they can move around and they are determined. It's not a question of political personalities, but of arms and weapons."

It is amazing that none of the bright light for the New American Century could figure out that the power vacuum left by the removal of Saddam would be filled quickly and not wait for their incompetent efforts. Maybe they thought the US would be the new power center? They certainly thought they could mold and influence the new power center. And they were wrong.

"Insurgent infiltration and militia influence remain a concern for the Ministry of the Interior," the report said. "Many serving police officers, particularly in the south, have ties to Shia militias."

The ascent of the militias inside the security forces was quick and quiet. Soon after the Shiite-led government swept into power last spring and Bayan Jabr, a senior Shiite politician, become interior minister, a housecleaning began, in which about 140 high-ranking officials were dismissed and political allies of the Shiites were put in their place, according to several former ministry officials who feared reprisals if they gave their names. In addition, recruitment drives brought hundreds of ordinary Shiites into the security forces, many of whom identified more strongly with their political parties than with the Iraqi state.

By summer, an American government adviser to the ministry, Mathew Sherman, recalled writing in his notes that "the ministry is quickly being infiltrated by militia and by Badr people."

As Condi would say, "Who could have imagined this would happen?"